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ABSTRACT
The empirical relationship between capital controls and the financial development of credit and
equity markets is examined. We extend the literature on this subject along a number of dimensions.
Specifically, we (1) investigate a substantially broader set of proxy measures of financial development;
(2) create and utilize a new index based on the IMF measures of exchange restrictions that incorporates
a measure of the intensity of capital controls; and (3) extend the previous literature by systematically
examining the implications of institutional (legal) factors. The results suggest that the rate of financial
development, as measured by private credit creation and stock market activity, is linked to the existence
of capital controls. However, the strength of this relationship varies with the empirical measure used, and
the level of development. These results also suggest that only in an environment characterized by a
combination of a higher level of legal and institutional development will the link between financial
openness and financial development be readily detectable. A disaggregated analysis indicates that in
emerging markets the most important components of these legal factors are the levels of shareholder
protection and of accounting standards.
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1. Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed a resurgence of interest in financial development as a key driver 
of economic growth.
1  At the same time, the effects of capital controls have taken center stage in a 
number of policy debates, especially in the wake of the East Asian currency crises.
2 Hence, it appears 
appropriate to now direct analytical attention to the question of whether capital controls are 
compatible with financial development. The centerpiece of our discussion will be an econometric 
analysis, using aggregate data on a large sample of countries over the 1977-1997 period. 
The analysis in this paper departs from that found in much of the extant literature. First, the 
analysis skirts the financial development-growth versus capital liberalization-growth debate, and 
restricts its attention to the linkage between capital liberalization and financial development. Second, 
a larger set of financial development measures is used, including those pertaining to equity markets. 
Third, a larger set of measures on restrictions on international financial transactions is used. That 
translates into use of all the IMF’s indicators of exchange restrictions with the incorporation of their 
intensity. Fourth, cross-country differences in the legal and institutional environment for financial 
transactions are also incorporated in our analysis, which will allow us to investigate their impact on 
the effectiveness of capital liberalization on financial development. 
Section 2 is reviews the relevant literature, while Section 3 presents the model specification, 
data description, and empirical results. In Section 4 the focus is expanded to include the influence of 
legal and institutional foundations on financial development. Concluding remarks are in Section 5. 
 
2. A Selective Review of the Literature  
In contrast to the large body of cross-country work investigating the link between finance and 
growth, literature examining the link between capital controls and/or financial openness and financial 
development is fairly small. One paper of interest is by De Gregorio (1998). He examines the related 
                                                           
1  See for instance Leahy, et al. (2001) for OECD-specific results. Klein and Olivei (2001) document the linkage for 
developed countries, and its absence for less developed countries. Spiegel (2001) examines an APEC sample, while 
Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001) document the fragility of many of these group-specific results. IMF 
(2001, Chapter 4) surveys both the growth and finance, and finance and liberalization literature. For the most recent 
review on finance and growth, refer to Quinn, et al. (2002) 
2 In this study we do not discuss the merits of capital controls in the context of financial crises.  For a review, see 
Aizenman (2002). Kletzer and Mody (2000) survey the debate in the context of  “self-protection policies” for 
emerging markets.   2
question of whether economies exhibiting greater financial integration experience greater financial 
development. Instead of relying upon financial restrictions of a regulatory nature, he investigates the 
effect of lack of financial integration characterized by deviations from two no arbitrage profits 
conditions, the international arbitrage pricing model (IAPM) of Levine and Zervos (1995) and the 
international capital asset pricing model (ICAPM) of Levine and Zervos (1998).  
After controlling for inflation rates and trade openness, De Gregorio finds that in a 
cross-section of developing and industrialized countries, the no-arbitrage profits conditions have a 
positive and statistically significant effect upon the lending, stock market capitalization and volatility 
measures of financial deepening. The total value of shares traded per year measure only appears to 
depend upon the ICAPM measure.  
In these analyses, one important distinction is that between behavior in developed and 
developing countries. In the sample for which De Gregorio has data on the gross capital flows and 
composite measures, the observations are restricted to developing countries. In these samples, he 
finds only mixed evidence for any of these two measures having an effect. Gross capital flows do 
appear to be correlated with the lending measure of financial deepening, an intuitive finding; at the 
same time, this is the least convincing measure of the variable of interest.
3 
More recently, Klein and Olivei (2001) examine a cross-section of 87 industrialized and less 
developed countries over the 1976-1995 period. Their agenda actually includes both the link between 
financial development and economic growth, as well as the nexus of liberalization and finance we are 
interested. Here, we merely recount the results pertinent to the question at hand. Their regressions 
take the form of:  
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where FD is the financial development variable, KALIB is the capital account liberalization variable, 
and X is a set of control variables, including regional and time dummies. 
Their measures of financial development include the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, the 
proportion of financial intermediates’ claims on the private sector to GDP, and the ratio of private 
bank to private plus central bank assets. Each of these measures has strengths and weaknesses. The 
                                                           
3  Unfortunately, De Gregorio (1998) does not report results for the no-arbitrage profits measures broken down by 
developing and developed countries. This is probably due to the small number of observations (there are about 24   3
liquid liabilities measure is the most common measure of financial development; it consists of the 
sum of currency outside the banking system, plus demand and interest bearing liabilities of the 
banking system.  This measure, however, does not distinguish between allocation to private and 
public sector entities, and hence could misleadingly indicate that a country with directed lending to 
state owned enterprises actually had a advanced financial system, when in fact the banking system 
was failing in its role as project monitor. The private claims measure addresses this deficiency, and is 
similar to the series used by De Gregorio. Both of these data series are readily available. Finally, the 
commercial bank assets ratio is meant to focus on the development of those services that are most 
related to financial management. 
For KALIB, Klein and Olivei use the most common measure of capital account liberalization 
–  the IMF’s indicator variable on capital account restrictions from the Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) – or for a subset of industrialized countries, the 
OECD measure of capital account liberalization.  
Comfortingly, Klein and Olivei find a relationship between capital account liberalization and 
financial development. However, one marked and notable aspect of their results is that the identified 
correlation is driven entirely by the developed countries in their sample. In other words, there is no 
detectable relationship between liberalization and development for the less developed countries. 
Klein and Olivei conjecture that this result obtains because the less developed countries were 
latecomers to the liberalization game; hence it may merely be the case that the effects of 
liberalization have not yet been felt, and that time will tell. 
  To our knowledge, analyses with a similar cross-country breadth to the Klein and Olivei 
study have not been performed for stock or bond market measures, although there have a number of 
papers focusing on growth effects of liberalizing access to equity markets.
 4 Consequently, it appears 
useful to re-examine the issues raised by the previous studies systematically. 
 
3.  An Econometric Analysis of Financial Openness and Development  
The analysis that we conduct takes a broad view of financial development – that is it includes 
the lending measures typically used, but also incorporates various measures of the equity markets. In 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
observations per integration measure). 
4  See Bekaert et al. (2000) for growth, and Chari and Henry (2002) for investment, for instance. Henry (2000) 
evaluates the liberalization effects on abnormal returns in a short window, which is tangentially related to some of 
our measures of equity market development.   4
some respects, the development of equity markets may be a better measure of the ability of an 
economy to mobilize capital in an efficient manner; conventional measures of lending activity are 
susceptible to mis-characterizing government directed lending as market driven lending. Hence, a 
variety of financial deepening measures are used, although results from only a subset of the measures 
analyzed will be reported.  
 
3.1  The Empirical Specification 
  In principle, one would like to estimate the long run equilibrium relationship in:  
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where KAOPEN  is a measure of capital openness (or an inverse of a measure of capital controls), and 
X is a vector of economic control variables. The capital control variables are described in greater 
detail in the data section. Here we focus on the economic rationale underpinning the other right hand 
side variables, in the X vector, which could in principle include a very large number of variables. In 
this analysis, the set is kept fairly small, so as to retain some interpretability of the correlations. The 
economic variables include log per capita income in PPP terms, the inflation rate, and trade openness, 
measured as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP.  
Log per capita income is included as there is a long literature ascribing financial deepening, 
aside from the role of regulation, to the increasing complexity of economic structures associated with 
rising income. The inflation rate is included because it (or the volatility in the inflation rate)
5 may 
cause distortions in decision-making regarding nominal magnitudes. In particular, moderate to high 
inflation may discourage financial intermediation, and encourage saving in real assets. Finally, trade 
openness is included as an ad hoc control; many empirical studies find a correlation of trade openness 
with any number of economic variables. 
It turns out that it is difficult to control for secular trends in financial deepening in the context 
of the panel regression in levels, as in equation 2.
6 This is most likely due to the large cyclical 
                                                           
5  Since in most cases, the volatility of inflation rises with the inflation rate, the inflation rate could be proxying for 
either or both of these effects. 
6  See Chinn (2001) for some representative regression results using individual measures of controls from the IMF.   5
variations in the financial deepening variables, along with trending behavior of the variables of 
interest. Hence, an alternative specification, akin to a panel error-correction model, is estimated:  
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This regression carries with it the following interpretation: The rate of financial development 
depends inversely upon the level of financial development, negatively upon the extent of capital 
controls (or positively upon the degree of financial openness), and upon a series of economic control 
variables.
7 
The use of the long horizon of five years (the average annual growth rate over a five year 
period) has two advantages. First, it serves to minimize the effect of correlations due to business 
cycle fluctuations. Second, relating the growth rate between period t-5 and period t to the level of 
variables dated at time t-5 serves to mitigate endogeneity problems. Specifically, in regressions of 
either the level or the growth rate of financial development on variables such as per capita income or 
more importantly capital controls, one could easily imagine two way causality at the annual 
frequency. For instance, increases in the ratio of private credit to GDP might cause more rapid GDP 
growth. Or increasing stock market capitalization might induce policymakers to have a less sanguine 
view of the effects of capital controls. Analyzing the data at five year horizons mitigates (but does not 
completely solve) this problem.  
The drawback, of course, is that one is throwing away some data by using average growth 
rates (non-overlapping panel analysis), and sampling the “initial conditions” at every five years. The 
ideal solution would be to purge the data of cyclical fluctuations and instrument the right hand side 
variables; in a large panel study of this nature, it is difficult to implement such econometric 
techniques in a manner that is appropriate, so we resort to simpler and more readily interpretable 
methods. In any event, this approach is common to the literature (and in our opinion is preferred to 
pure cross section regressions that examine growth over a very long horizon such as 20 years). 
 
3.2  Data 
The data are drawn from a number of sources, primarily the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators, the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, and the databases associated   6
with Beck, Kunt, and Levine (2000). The analysis is based upon data originally recorded at an annual 
frequency, over the 1970-1997 period, covering 105 countries. Details are reported in Appendix 1. 
 
3.2.1 Financial Development Indicators.  
A large number of indicators were examined; only a subset actually used in the analysis, or 
discussed in the text, are described below (the remaining are described in Appendix 1). The first set is 
the most familiar: LLY is liquid liabilities to GDP ratio, while PCGDP is the ratio of private credit 
from deposit money banks to the private sector.
8 The second set is slightly less familiar, and applies 
to the equity markets. SMKC is the ratio of the stock market capitalization to GDP, SMTV is the ratio 
of total value of stocks traded to GDP, and SMTO is the stock market turn over ratio. EQTY is the 
equity issues to GDP ratio. 
Finally, there are a series of measures that pertain to the bond markets. Unfortunately, the 
number of observations is quite small, and the cross-country coverage quite narrow.
9  For instance, 
there are only about 140 annual observations on long-term private debt issues, while there are over 
1900 on the liquid liabilities measures. When the specification involves five year growth rates, the 
number of observations is so small that we are unable to obtain any interesting results for this 
particular aspect of financial development, even though long term financing through bonds is likely 
to be an important factor in economic development (See for example Herring and Chatusripitak 
(2000)). 
Figure 1 shows annual observations on three key measures of financial deepening (liquid 
liabilities, private credit, and stock market capitalization). There is a clear correlation between the 
two banking sector related measures, while the relationship with capitalization is less obvious. The 
top seven rows of Table 1 report summary statistics for financial development indicators including 
these variables, while Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                
7  We also included time fixed effects  to capture possible time-specific exogenous shocks. 
8  Many researchers use the ratio of M2 (the sum of M1 and quasi money) to GDP (M2Y in our data set). However, 
since the correlation between liquid liabilities (LLY) and M2 ratios is quite high (see Table 1 for summary statistics 
and Table 2 for the correlation coefficients), and the results do not differ substantially when using one or the other 
variable, M2 will not be discussed in this paper. 
9  Data are available for the following series: PVBM, the private bond market capitalization to GDP ratio; PBBM, 
the public bond market capitalization to GDP ratio; and LTPD is the long term private debt issues to GDP ratio.   7
 
3.2.2 Quantifying Capital Controls 
There is no question that it is extremely difficult to measure the extent of capital account 
controls. Many measures have been created to describe the extent and intensity of capital account 
controls. However, there is a general impression that most extant measures fail to capture the 
complexity of real-world capital controls.
10  This view prevails because regulatory limitations on 
capital flows have a multidimensional character, allowing policy makers many options. Since 
different restrictions can have different implications for economic performance, capital restrictions 
can differ depending upon the intension of policy makers and the economic state where they are in. 
Moreover, it is almost impossible to distinguish between de jure and de facto controls on capital 
transactions as seen in the case of multiple exchange rates systems in many developing countries and 
the mandatory reserve requirement in Chile in the 1990’s.
11 
Most of analyses of either effects of capital controls, or their determinants, rely upon the 
IMF’s categorical enumeration, reported in Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (hereafter AREAER). AREAER provides information on the extent and nature 
of the restrictions on external accounts for a wide cross-section of countries. In this set of “on-off” 
clarification, k1 is an indicator variable for the existence of multiple exchange rates, while k4 is a 
variable indicating the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. The most relevant capital 
controls are k2 and k3. They indicate restrictions on current account and capital account transactions, 
respectively.  
The eighth through eleventh rows of Table 1 report summary statistics for these capital 
control measures.
12  Restrictions on the capital account and the surrender of export proceeds appear 
to be the most pervasive. However, all of these capital controls appear to be decreasing in their use 
(although one cannot conclude that they are decreasing in terms of how tightly they bind). 
The deficiencies of these dichotomous measures of capital controls are well known. The most 
obvious is that they do not measure the intensity of the controls, nor do they speak to their efficacy (in 
                                                           
10  See Edison and Warnock (2001), Edwards (2001), and Edison et al. (2002) for discussions and comparisons of 
various measures on capital restrictions. 
11  Dooley (1996) provides an extensive literature review and Neely (1999) presents a descriptive overview on 
capital controls 
12  As we will explain later, we reversed binary variables of the AREAER series in order to focus on the effect of 
financial openness, not controls. Therefore, the more pervasive capital controls are, the ki variables tend to be closer 
to zero. Also, a positive average growth rate means that capital controls are less and less in use.   8
this regard, one might prefer the outcome-based measures De Gregorio uses).
13  To illustrate this 
assertion, note that for instance, capital controls might be as stringent and command-and-control 
oriented as those imposed by the Latin American governments in the wake of the 1980's debt crises, 
or of a less dirigiste form such as the Chilean controls.
14 
A common method used to overcome the deficiencies of the dichotomous measures of capital 
controls entails the construction of variables that depend on the proportion of years in the examined 
window for which countries had liberalized capital accounts using the AREAER variables (See 
Edwards (2001) and Klein and Olivei (2001)
15). However, as Edison et al. (2002) admit, a drawback 
of this method is that such indicators do not convey any information about whether the country is on 
its way to liberalizing or restricting its capital accounts. In concrete terms, a value of 0.5 can indicate 
that the capital account was closed the first half of the period, and open the second, or vice versa. 
Quinn (1997) has recently compiled a composite measure of financial regulation that ranges from 0 
to 14, with 14 representing the least regulated and most open regime. The bulk of the index is based 
upon Quinn’s coding of the qualitative information contained in the various issues of AREAER 
pertaining to k2 and k3, augmented by information regarding whether the country in question has 
entered into international agreements with international organizations such as the OECD and 
European Union.  
Considering the deficiencies of the AREAER variables, it might be preferable to implement 
the empirical analysis using this set of Quinn variables. However, while a complete tabulation for the 
OECD members exists, the coverage for the less developed countries is much less extensive; values 
are reported only for certain years (1958, 1973, 1982, and 1988).  
Hence, an index based on the AREAER binary series is constructed with the goal of 
incorporating the intensity of capital controls. Our index on capital controls is the first standardized 
principal component of the aforementioned k1 through k4 binary variables. Also, in order to focus on 
the effect of financial openness – rather than controls – we reverse the values of the binary variables 
                                                           
13  There had also been criticism that the dichotomous measures based on the AREAER fail to distinguish between 
the types of flow that are being restricted. In 1997, AREAER started publishing the data on disaggregated 
components of capital controls, with the specification of thirteen categories including, for the first time, a 
distinction between restrictions on inflows and outflows as well as between different types of capital transactions. 
See Johnston and Tamirisa (1998) for a descriptive overview and statistical analysis on the disaggregated data of 
AREAER. 
14  Specifically the unrenumerated reserve requirements (URR), that sought to discourage short term capital inflows 
and hence outflows. See Edwards (1998, 1999) 
15  Edison et al. (2002) articulately reviews and compares different methods of quantifying capital controls.   9
of the AREAER series, such that the variable takes a value of unity when the restrictions are 
non-existent. Moreover, for controls on capital transactions (k3), we use the share of a five year 
window that controls were not in effect (SHAREk3). Specifically, the financial openness variable for 
year t is proportion of five years encompassing year t and the preceding four years that the capital 
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Hence, our index for capital “openness” is, 
 
KAOPENt = the first standardized principal component of k1,t, k2,t, SHAREk3,t, and k4,t, 
 
which takes on higher values the more open the country is to cross-border capital transactions.  
The thirteenth row of Table 1 reports the summary statistics of KAOPEN. By construction, 
the KAOPEN series are mean of zero. The table shows that the average of KAOPEN among the 
countries is growing at 3.8% annually. The first eigenvector for KAOPEN was found to be 
(SHAREk3, k1, k2, k4)’ = (0.563, 0.280, 0.516, 0.582)’, indicating that the variability of KAOPEN is 
not merely driven by the SHAREk3 series. 
The incorporation of the k1,t, k2,t, and k4,t variables merits some discussion. We interpret these 
variables as indicators of the intensity of the capital controls. This point can be made more concrete 
by considering a country with an open capital account. It may still restrict the flow of capital by 
limiting transactions on the current account restrictions or other systems such as multiple exchange 
rates and requirements to surrender export proceeds. Alternatively, countries that already have closed 
capital accounts might try to increase the stringency of those controls by imposing k1, k2, and k4 types 
of restrictions so that the private sector cannot circumvent the capital account restrictions.
16  Since 
our indicator incorporates these other controls, one could interpret our measure as a variant of the 
ones used by Edwards (2001) and Klein and Olivei (2001). 
                                                           
16  Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti also tried to overcome the issue of intensity of the AREAER variables by employing the 
binary variables for current account restrictions and multiple exchange rate practices, but not the one for export 
proceeds surrender), though they used these variables individually in their regression models.   10
An alternative principal components-based measure, incorporating black market foreign 
exchange premia, was also considered. However, the empirical results obtained using this alternative 
measure were very similar to those obtained using our basic index. Consequently, we opted to report 
results using only the first principal component of SHAREk3, k1, k2, and k4 alone. 
To check the robustness of our analysis based on the KAOPEN index, we also use a Quinn 
measure of financial regulation. However, since the measure is not complete for the developing 
countries, a linear imputation method is employed to fill the missing variables of those countries 
based on the regression of the actual Quinn series on the AREAER ki variables. For more detailed 
explanations on this imputation method, refer to Appendix 2.  
 
3.3  Results 
Figure 2 illustrates the correlation between private credit (PCGDP) and stock market 
capitalization (SMKC) on one hand, and the first principal component of financial openness 
(KAOPEN). The PCGDP series appears to vary in the expected manner with the capital openness 
proxy (positively), while the association between SMKC and the capital openness variable is 
indecisive. However, one has to recall that financial development and the absence of capital controls 
can be both positively correlated with other economic variables such as per capita income. Hence, the 
positive association visible in Figure 3, even if it exists, may not survive regression analysis.  
Table 3 reports the results estimating equation (3) over the entire sample. Columns 1 and 2 
show the regression results on the relationship between financial openness and the development of 
bank credit markets, whereas Columns 3 through 6 on the relationship between financial openness 
and equity market development. The change in private credit (column 2) appears to be closely linked 
to financial openness, and that in liquid liabilities (column 1) appears to be weakly linked. Per capita 
income and trade openness enter in with the expected positive sign in almost all cases, as does 
inflation with the negative sign. In the results using the equity market measures, only the growth rate 
of stock market value traded – a more representative indicator of equity market activity than stock 
market capitalization – is significantly affected by financial openness (column 4). In general, 
however, the proportion of variation explained in the equity market development indicators is higher 
than in the cases using the bank credit measures. 
It is possible that these observed patterns are being driven by the decision to pool both 
industrialized and less developed economies into one sample. This applies to both the apparent   11
sensitivity of equity market indicators to financial openness, and the absence of any relationship of 
bank credit measures to financial openness. Hence, Table 4 presents the results for two different 
developing country samples. 
The first six columns of Table 4 show the results for a subsample of less developed countries 
(under the LDC heading). Unlike the full sample case, bank credit indicators (columns 1 and 2) do 
not appear to be affected by financial openness. Among the equity market indicators, again, the 
measure of equity market activity (value traded, column 4) appears to be significantly influenced by 
financial openness (with the p-value of 9%). This result illustrates that in the less developed countries 
one unit of increase in financial openness can lead to a 0.5% acceleration in the growth rate of the 
stock market value traded ratio. 
Another subset of countries yields more interesting results. The last six columns of Table 4 
display the results of the same study conducted on the emerging market countries (EMG).
17  While 
financial openness previously did not appear to significantly affect bank credit creation in the LDC 
subsample, it does appear to have a significant impact among the EMG countries on bank credit 
development in terms of private credit creation (column 8). Interestingly, the measures of equity 
market development (columns 10 through 12) except for stock market capitalization appear to be 
statistically significant upon financial openness (the p-value for the equity issued variable is 16%), 
out of which only the measure of stock market value traded was significantly linked to financial 
openness in the full sample and developing countries subsample cases.  
The magnitude of the effect of financial openness is quite different between the LDC and 
EMG subsamples. For example, between 1992 and 1997, Argentina, an EMG country, increased its 
openness in terms of KAOPEN from –1.09 to 2.09. The results shown in Column 10 of Table 4 show 
that this 3.18 unit increase in KAOPEN , other things being equal, implies an acceleration of the 
annual growth rate of Argentina’s stock market value traded by 2.1%, whereas the same amount of 
increase in financial openness implies only a 1.6% annual growth for a typical non-emerging market 
LDC.
18  Moreover, while financial openness has a nil effect on stock market turnover among LDCs, 
the magnitude of its effect is significantly high among the EMG countries (for Argentina, the same 
                                                           
17  See the Country List for a full list of the emerging market countries.  The definition of the emerging market 
countries is based on Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2000) where they define as emerging market countries the 
thirty countries which are classified by the IFC (World Bank) as either emerging or frontier during the period of 
1980-1997. 
18  In fact, KAOPEN for Uruguay, categorized as an LDC, increased by 0.46 between 1992 and 1997, implying an 
acceleration of merely 0.2%.   12
change in KAOPEN as in the previous case could have led to an annual growth of 4.3%). A one unit 
increase in financial openness can raise private credit growth in the EMG by 0.5%, an effect that is 
not only higher than that exhibited in the LDC sample, but also in the full sample. Clearly, there is a 
sharp difference in the effect of financial openness on financial development, in terms of both bank 
credit creation and equity market development, between the LDC and EMG categories, with the 
latter group of countries possibly reaping more from financial openness.  
The econometric analysis thus confirms what other studies have found – namely that the 
relationship between the removal of capital controls and bank credit measures of financial 
development does not hold for developing countries. On the other hand, among the emerging market 
countries, both bank credit and equity market development do appear to be linked to financial 
openness in a significant manner, thus yielding a perspective on the relationship between capital 




3.4.1 Analysis with Imputed Quinn Measures 
The above tests were repeated using the aforementioned Quinn measures. Table A-1 shows 
the results for the regressions using the linearly interpolated Quinn measures (“pseudo-Quinn”). 
Some similarities between this set of results and the previous one with the full sample are apparent; 
financial openness appears to have an effect on private credit development (column 2) and the 
development of equity market activity (column 4). As indicated by the results of the basic regressions 
with LDC and EMG subsamples in Table A-2, the similarity still holds for the subsamples of LDC 
and EMG, though the difference is not as marked as it was using the basic model. The link between 
financial openness and financial development exists for private credit only with the EMG subsample, 
and the link is somewhat stronger for equity market development with the EMG subsample. 
                                                           
19  Following the debates in the finance-growth literature that regression results in this type of analysis can be highly 
sensitive to model specifications (Klein and Olivei (2001)), we also implemented fixed effects regressions (results 
not reported). In these estimates, the statistical significance of the financial openness variable remained for private 
credit (as it did for LDC and EMG subsamples). However, it largely disappears in the specifications for equity 
market development indicators. This outcome is unsurprising, as the country fixed effects are highly correlated with 
the financial openness of an individual country. While it has been argued that fixed effects regressions allow for 
heterogeneity among countries, some claim it is not reasonable to employ such regressions because they carry a risk 
of treating heterogeneity among the countries constant over the sample time period.   13
Interestingly, the fit of the model (as measured by R
2) is roughly the same regardless whether the 
KAOPEN or the pseudo-Quinn variable is used.  
The regression results based on the two indicators of financial openness are not directly 
comparable, as the KAOPEN results pertain to a sample encompassing 105 countries, while the 
pseudo-Quinn results are for a sample of 59 countries (for which actual Quinn data exist so that linear 
extrapolation is feasible).
20 However, if we restrict the samples to be the same, one finds that the 
previously identified pattern of results remains in place. 
 
3.4.2 Analysis with Instrumental Variables 
In order to investigate whether simultaneity is a problem, two stage least squares is 
implemented, using the government budget balance and current account balance as instrumental 
variables. The rationale for using these two variables follows from the findings of Grilli and 
Milesi-Ferretti (1995). Using AREAER’s k1, k2, and k3 variables as the proxy for the intensity of 
capital controls, they showed that multiple exchange rate practices (k1), capital controls in the narrow 
sense (i.e., k3), and current account (k2) are empirically linked to higher rates of inflation, a higher 
share of seigniorage in total taxes, and lower real interest rates. Furthermore, capital controls tend to 
be implemented in countries where government consumption as a share of GDP is relatively large 
and the economy is more closed to trade. They conjecture the statistical relationship between capital 
controls and lower real interest rates is capturing other forms of government-imposed distortions 
such as financial repression.
21  Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti’s finding implies that capital controls appear 
to have strong fiscal implications, i.e., countries with a less developed tax system tend to implement 
capital controls as the source of government revenue as well as the remedy to capital flows caused by 
the inflation-driven distortions in the financial markets.  
More recently, Johnson and Tamirisa (1998) investigated the empirical determinants of 
capital controls. Their analysis is innovative in that they used the newly created disaggregate 
components of capital controls publicized in the AREAER. They tested their theoretical prediction 
that capital controls may be motivated by (1) balance of payments concerns, (2) macroeconomic 
                                                           
20  See Appendix 2 for an explanation of the linear extrapolation methodology employed to obtain the 
pseudo-Quinn variable. The countries for which Quinn reports figures for are indicated in the country list (with a 
superscript c). 
21  Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti also found that the less independent the central bank is, the more likely capital controls 
are to be imposed. This result is also in line with higher real interest rates and the government’s tendency to rely   14
management, (3) infant industry policy toward underdeveloped financial markets and regulatory 
systems (the stage of development of the financial system), (4) prudential policy by the government 
to avoid financial (banking) crisis, and (5) other reasons. Broadly speaking, their finding suggested 
that countries tend to implement capital controls, the more prevalent the balance of payments 
concerns are,
22 the higher real interest rates and real exchange rates,
23 and the larger the size of the 
government deficit as a share of GDP. 
Following these findings, we use the government budget surplus to GDP ratio (GSUR) and 
current account balance ratio (CURRENT) as instruments. Regional dummies are also included in 
order to capture regional differences. In order to minimize the possibility of two-way causality, both 
variables are lagged. 
As a preliminary analysis, the following regression is estimated using the annual data 
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The resulting estimates of both φ1 and φ2 are statistically significant with theoretically predicted 
signs, i.e., φ1 , φ2 > 0.
24 
Tables 5 and 6 report the results of the regressions instrumented with the one period lagged 
variables for government budget balance and current account balance (GSURt-6 and CURRENTt-6, 
respectively). In general, the estimated magnitude and statistical significance of the capital openness 
effect are larger for both the full and sub- sample sets. The most interesting difference from the OLS 
estimates is that the IV-estimated coefficient for stock market turnover is now quite strong and 
statistically significant. The subsample of less developing countries presents the strongest results. 
The coefficient for stock market value traded is much stronger. In contrast to the OLS estimates, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
upon seigniorage revenues, i.e., higher inflation. 
22  They mainly used gross international reserves in months of imports as an indicator to capture the balance of 
payments situation of countries. The lower gross reserves in months of imports, the higher prevalence of balance of 
payments concerns are. 
23  This result contrasts with that of Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti. Their theoretical prediction is that countries use 
capital controls to pursue inconsistent internal and external balances simultaneously such as the case where outflow 
controls are implemented to avoid nominal currency deprecation pressures without tightening of monetary 
conditions. When such a threat of currency crisis arises, the real interest rates or real exchange rates tends to be 
higher. 
24  Among the regional dummies, the estimated coefficients for AFRICA and EUROPE were significantly negative 
and positive, respectively, suggesting that African countries tend to have higher capital controls, whereas European 
countries tend to have lower ones.   15
coefficients for private credit and stock market turnover are now larger in both magnitude and 
(typically) statistical significance.  
 
3.4.3 Outliers, Measurement Errors, and the Financial Bubbles  
Lastly, we examine whether our baseline results are sensitive to outliers. Concerns about the 
impact of outliers flows from two issues. First, in addition to the usual measurement error present in 
macroeconomic data, it is likely that the data for financial development is subject to even greater 
measurement errors. Second, these financial development indicators may unintentionally capture 
financial bubbles. The use of five year changes may serve to mitigate this concern, although it cannot 
completely address it. As a point of reference, it is useful to note that in many studies of lending 
booms as financial crises indicators, changes in lending over a shorter window, of between 2 to 4 
years are, often used (Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998); Chinn, Dooley and Shrestha (1999); 
Kaminsky, Linzodo and Reihart (1998); Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996)). Nonetheless, we 
investigate whether the regression results are being distorted by data outliers. In order to conserve 
space, we merely summarize the results and our observation below. 
First, using the original annual data, we exclude the observations of financial development 
variables if their annual growth rates are larger than two standard deviations away from the mean, 
and re-estimate the same sets of regressions.
25  The exclusion of outliers shrank the observation size 
by a relatively small degree, about 3 – 11%, and hardly affects the regression results from the 
baseline cases. The same exercise is then repeated, but increasing the range of outlier exclusion by 
dropping the observations if their annual growth rates are larger than one standard deviation away 
from the mean. This exclusion shrinks the sample size of the full or sub- sample five year panel sets 
by about 13-19%. Interestingly, in most cases, the estimated coefficients became slightly larger 
compared to the baseline cases, but their standard errors remained about the same or increased 
slightly. The estimates using the liquid liabilities measure of financial development in the full sample 
are now statistically significant at the 2% of significance level, whereas in the baseline regressions 
they were only marginally significant. Except for that of stock market capitalization, estimates of the 
effect of financial openness rose slightly in both magnitude and statistical significance. Hence, one 
may safely conclude that outliers do not drive the results we have obtained. 
                                                           
25  Since we are dealing with a set of non-overlapping five year panels, in essence the only data for 1977, 1982, 
1987, 1992, and 1997 are affected by the removal of outliers.   16
 
4. The Interaction of Financial Development and Legal Factors 
4.1   Overview 
The previous analysis carries a risk of treating the behavior of countries at different stages of 
institutional development as the same when doing so is inappropriate. In this section, we relax this 
assumption and examine the implications of conditioning on legal and institutional features. 
Legal foundations and institutions governing financial transactions are especially important 
for the development of the financial system. In the economies where the legal system does not clearly 
define property rights or guarantee the enforcement of contracts, the incentives for loan activities can 
be limited. Legal protections for creditors and the level of credibility and transparency of accounting 
rules are also likely to affect economic agents’ financial decisions.
26 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (hereafter LLSV, 1998) demonstrate that 
the national legal origin (whether English, French, German, or Scandinavian) strongly affects the 
legal and regulatory environment in financial transactions and explains cross-country differences in 
financial development. Basing their dataset partly on the data presented in LLSV, Levine, Loayza, 
and Beck (2000) investigate whether the level of legal and regulatory determinants of financial 
development influences the development financial intermediary sector.
27  They find a positive link 
between cross-country differences in the legal and regulatory environment and those in the level of 
financial intermediary development.  
In their investigation on the correlation between capital account liberalization and growth, 
Arteta, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (2001) also examine whether legal/institutional development 
influences the effectiveness of capital account liberalization on growth.
28  Their cross-country 
investigation reports some evidence that the effect of capital account liberalization on economic 
growth varies with the degree of legal/institutional development.  
In this section, our capital openness index is interacted with variables of legal/institutional 
development to determine whether the level of legal/institutional development influences the impact 
of financial openness.  
                                                           
26  For a general discussion on the importance of legal and institutional foundations for financial development, see 
Beim and Calomiris (2001). 
27  The main focus in their study is to investigate whether financial intermediary development leads to economic 
growth. They find a positive link between the two. 
28  They use the (unprocessed) Quinn index for the measurement of capital account openness.   17
 
4.2   Data on Legal/Institutional Development 
For the variables depicting legal/institutional development, we directly use the variables from 
LLSV. Specifically, the variables CREDITOR, ENFORCE, SHRIGHTS, ACCOUNT, and LEGAL are 
employed. CREDITOR refers to the level of creditor protection; a higher CREDITOR indicates more 
legal protections for creditors. ENFORCE is the index of the effectiveness of the legal system in 
enforcing contracts, whereas SHRIGHTS is the index of the extent of shareholder protection, and 
ACCOUNT of the comprehensiveness of company reports. LEGAL is the first standardized principal 
component of CREDITOR, ENFORCE, SHRIGHTS, and ACCOUNT, and, therefore, depicts the 
overall development of the legal system governing financial transactions. See the Appendix 1 for 
more details. 
Before discussing the results incorporating these institutional variables, the following two 
observations must be made. The first pertains to the temporal nature of these institutional variables. 
Although we have used the panel data on financial development and financial openness measures in 
the previous section, the data on legal/institutional development are cross-sectional in nature, i.e., 
they are time-invariant. However, the inclusion of these time-invariant factors should not pose a 
substantial problem for our analysis, since these characteristics, such as creditor protection, contract 
enforcement, shareholder protection, and accounting standards, are likely to change only very 
slowly. Our focus is mainly on the effect of financial openness on financial development, but not the 
effect of legal/institutional development per se. In other words, rather than shedding light on how the 
development of institutions and legal systems affects financial development, we examine how the 
effect of financial openness changes depending upon the “environment” of institutions and legal 
systems. Therefore, time-variance of legal/institutional variables is not crucial to our study.  
The second issue is sample size. In section 2, the panel encompassed 105 countries. In 
contrast, the data set based on LLSV spans less than 50 countries.
29  While there is minimal impact 
regarding coverage of the industrialized countries, the size of the LDC sample is substantially 
reduced. Consequently, our LDC sample in this portion of the analysis becomes essentially the 
                                                           
29  More specifically, the data set contains LEGAL data for 37 countries, CREDITOR for 44 countries, ENFORCE 
for 46 countries, SHRIGHTS for 46 countries, and ACCOUNT for 38 countries.   18
emerging market group previously defined.
30  Hence, we create a new subset titled the “LDC/EMG” 
category. 
 
4.3   Empirical Results 
At this point, regressions of financial development measures on financial openness, 
augmented with the legal/institutional variables are estimated. The specification is: 
 













i −= + + + +× ++ −− − − − 50 5 1 5 2 3 5 5 γρ γ γ γ () Γ  
 
where L
i denotes a legal/institutional variable. 
Table 7 reports the results of these regressions for the full sample (columns 1 through 5) and 
the LDC/EMG subsample (columns 6 through 10). There are two differences compared to the 
previous tables: the level term for legal/institutional development (LEGAL) and the interaction term 
between legal/institutional development and financial openness were added to the right hand side of 
the regression equation (rows 2 and 3, respectively), and the measure of new equity issued is dropped 
in the table because of the lack of observations.  
While private credit and stock market value traded, both of which were strongly significant 
in the baseline test, preserved statistical significance with the 10% level, Table 7 shows that the 
development of legal/institutional environment individually (i.e., not interacted with financial 
openness) is associated with the development of private credit, stock market capitalization, and stock 
market value traded in the full sample. The result for stock market value traded shows that the 
coefficient for the interactive term between legal environment and financial openness, that is, if it is 
coupled with a highly developed legal environment, capital liberalization can lead to a further 
development of stock market activities. These characteristics are not apparent in the LDC/EMG 
sample, except perhaps for the relationship between legal development and stock market 
capitalization and stock market value traded (row 2 in columns 8 and 9). Given these results, one 
might reasonably conclude that in countries with a relatively strong legal institutions, private credit 
can develop and the size of stock markets tend to be larger in terms of both size and activeness, and 
also that both private credit and stock market value traded can grow with capital liberalization, but 
                                                           
30  The LLSV cross-sectional data set used for this paper includes only three countries which are not either 
industrialized or emerging market countries by our definition.    19
with the latter developing even further if capital liberalization is coupled with a highly developed 
legal environment. However, there is weak evidence for less developed/emerging market countries. 
Table 8 reports results disaggregating the LEGAL index into its components. LEGAL is the 
first standardized principle component of CREDIT, ENFORCE, SHRIGHTS, and ACCOUNT, so 
using these variables individually as the institutional variables interacted with the financial openness 
index allows one to isolate the component-specific effects. For brevity, Table 8 reports only the 
coefficients for the financial openness variable, the level term for legal/institutional development 
(LEGAL), and the interaction term between financial openness and legal/institutional development.  
While creditor protection and the level of enforcement do not seem to have any noticeable 
effect on financial development individually or interactively in both full and LDC/EMG samples 
(except for stock market value traded), shareholder protection and accounting standards do seem to 
have an effect on both bank credit and equity market development. The level of SHRIGHTS appears 
to contribute to growth in stock market capitalization in both full and LDC/EMG samples. Although 
financial openness alone does not seem to affect stock market capitalization, if it is coupled with a 
higher level of shareholder protection, it has a marginal effect on the growth rate of stock market 
capitalization in emerging market countries. The results for stock market value traded are more 
positive. For both full and LDC/EMG samples, financial openness alone appears to have a negative 
effect, if any, on equity market development, but if it is implemented in countries where more 
shareholder protection is guaranteed, it significantly contributes to the development of the market. 
This effect of the interaction between shareholder protection and financial openness appears for stock 
market turnover in the LDC/EMG subsample as well. The marginal effect of interaction between 
capital openness and legal development is also found for stock market capitalization in LDC/EMG 
countries. Interestingly, the coefficient for capital openness is negative, if not insignificant, in all 
emerging market indicators. These results are in line with conventional wisdom that shareholder 
protection is essential for equity market development, and especially important for LDC/EMG 
countries. 
The results with ACCOUNT are stronger, especially for less developed countries. Among the 
LDC/EMG countries, the coefficient for the interactive term is significant for both bank credit 
indicators ([6] and [7]) and for stock market capitalization (and marginally for stock market value 
traded). For all of these indicators of financial development, the estimate for financial openness is 
negative, and statistically significant (except for stock market turnover), suggesting that financial   20
liberalization alone may cause a negative, or null at best, effect on financial development. The level 
itself of accounting standards is of course crucial for financial development (the level term has a 
significantly positive coefficient in columns 7 through 10), and it can also compensate the possible 
negative impact of financial liberalization.  
The results with a statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term suggest that 
while financial liberalization alone may have a zero, or even negative, impact on the development of 
the financial system, when combined with a well-developed legal system or institutions, it may well 
serve to stimulate financial development. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This study has reported the results of an exhaustive analysis of the empirical evidence 
regarding the relationship between financial openness and financial development. Our first key 
finding is that if one measures the level of financial development in terms of private credit creation 
and stock market value traded, there appears to be a strong relationship between the extent of capital 
controls and financial development. This finding holds for less developed countries in terms of stock 
market value traded, and even more so for emerging market countries. In this latter group, the linkage 
is particularly strong for private credit creation, stock market value traded, and stock market 
turnover.  
These results are robust to the presence of outliers in the data, and simultaneity. Indeed, if 
financial openness is instrumented with the level of government surplus and current account balance, 
the above findings appear to be even stronger. 
Perhaps most importantly, we econometrically verify the widely held belief that financial 
systems with a higher degree of legal/institutional development on average benefit more from 
financial liberalization than those with a lower one. In this sense, our results are in line with 
conventional wisdom. However, the positive effect of legal/institutional development seems to flow 
primarily from the degree of shareholder protection and accounting standards. That is, the 
liberalization of capital controls appears to have the largest effect on financial development when 
these indices are higher. Hence, we add to this perspective by identifying the dimensions of legal 
protections that are most strongly associated with rapid financial development in the wake of 
financial opening.   21
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Appendix 1: Data Definition and Sources 
Key to abbreviations: 
BKL: Beck, Kunt, and Levine (2000). 
IFS: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
LLSV: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) 
Mody: Personal communication from Ashok Mody, data based on AREAER 
Quinn: Personal communication from Dennis Quinn.  




ry – GDP, real, local currency, units (line 99b), 
IFS 
ny – GDP, nominal, local currency, units (99b), 
IFS 
m1 – M1, Stock End of Period, units (34), IFS 
qm – Quasi-money; M2, units (35), IFS 
mqm – Money plus Quasi-money, units (M1 + 
M2), IFS 
sprdl – Spread between average deposit and 
lending rates, %, (60p – 60l), IFS 
current – Current account balance as a ratio to 
GDP, WDI 
opn – openness to trade, (nominal exports plus 
imports)/nominal GDP 
exports =  national currency (from national 
account, 90c), IFS 
imports =  national currency (from national 
account, 98c), IFS 
rypc = per capital real income in international 
PPP, WDI 
cpi – Consumer price index (64), IFS 
infl – Inflation rate calculated using log 
differences of CPIs (64), IFS 
gsur – government budget surplus (+) or deficit 
(-) as a ratio to GDP, WDI 





idc – idc = 1 if industrialized country, and 0, 
otherwise (See the list of countries) 
emg – emg = 1 if emerging market country, and 
0, otherwise (See the list of countries) 
asia – dummy for Asian countries 
africa – dummy for African countries 
westhem – dummy for the countries in the west 
hemisphere  
europe – dummy for European countries 
mideast – dummy for Middle East countries 
 
Financial Development Indicators 
 
lly – Liquid Liability to GDP (LLY), currency 
demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks 
and other financial intermediaries divided by 
GDP, BKL, 1970-97.   
smkc – stock market capitalization ratio to 
GDP, BKL, 1970-97  
smtv – stock market total value traded to GDP, 
BKL, 1975-97  
smto – stock market turn over ratio, BKL, 
1975-97 
pvbm – private bond market capitalization to 
GDP, BKL, 1975-97 
pbbm – public bond market capitalization to 
GDP ratio, BKL, 1975-97  
eqty – equity issues to GDP, BKL, 1975-97  
ltpd – long-term private debt issues to GDP, 
BKL, 1975-97 
bts – Deposit Money Bank Assets to Total 
Financial Assets, BKL, 1970 – 1997 
dmcb – Deposit Money vs. Central Bank 
Assets, BKL, 1970 – 97 
dmgdp –  Deposit Money Bank Assets to GDP, 
BKL, 1970 – 97 
pcgdp – Private Credit by Deposit Money 
Banks to GDP, BKL, 1970 – 97 




Capital Controls Indicators 
 
k1 – multiple exchange rates, Mody 
k2 – restrictions on CA trans, Mody 
k3 – restrictions on KA trans, Mody 
k4 – surrender of exports proceeds, Mody 
SHAREk3 – Share of a five-year period, the 
observed year and the last four years, when the 
capital account was open. Authors’ calculations 
KAOPEN – index for openness to capital 
account transactions.  The first standardized 
principal components of k1, k2, SHAREk3, and 
k4 . Authors’ calculations. 
blmkpr – black market premium, World Bank 
openn – Quinn financial liberalization 
indicator, Quinn.  
 
 
Legal Institutional Variables 
 
legal – legal index, the first component of credit, 
enforce, shrights, and account, cross-sectional 
for 37 countries, LLSV 
credit – index of creditor protection, composed 
of the variables which incorporate the automatic 
stay proposition on the assets of a failing firm 
(“noauto”); the continuation of the old 
managers in a reorganization process 
(“manages”); restrictions for going into 
reorganization (“restorg”); and the seniority 
system of secured creditors (“secured1”), 
cross-sectional for 44countries, LLSV 
enforce – index of the degree of law 
enforcement. Specifically, it is the average of 
“judsys” (efficiency of the judicial system), 
“rulelaw” (rule of law), “riskEx” (risk of 
expropriation), and “contrepu” (risk of contract 
repudiation), average over period 1982 – 1995, 
cross-sectional for 46 countries, LLSV 
shrights – the sum of “oneshvt” (one share-one 
vote), “bymail” (proxy by mail allowed), 
“noblock” (shares not blocked before meeting), 
“comulvt” (cumulative voting/proportional 
representation), “oppdmnty” (oppressed 
minority), “premprt” (preemptive right to new 
issues), and “esm” (% of share capital to call an 
emergency shareholder meeting < 10%),
cross-sectional for 46 countries, LLSV  
account – index of transparency and 
comprehensiveness of companies’ (accounting) 
reports, based on data in 1990, cross-sectional 
for 38 countries, LLSV 
corrupt – corruption index, average over period 
1982 – 1997, (International Country Risk 
Guide) 
 
cn – country code (1-105), see the country list  26
Country list (105 countries) 
 
 
1 ARG  Argentina 
b, c 
2 AUS  Australia 
a, c 
3 AUT  Austria 
a, c 
4 BDI  Burundi   
5 BEL  Belgium 
a, c 
6 BEN  Benin   
7 BFA  Burkina  Faso 
8 BGD  Bangladesh 
b 
9 BHR  Bahrain   
10 BHS  Bahamas,  The 
11 BLZ  Belize   
12 BOL  Bolivia 
c 
13 BRA  Brazil 
b, c 
14 BRB  Barbados 
15 BWA  Botswana 
16  CAF  Central African Republic 
17 CAN  Canada 
a, c 
18 CHE  Switzerland 
a, c 
19 CHL  Chile 
b, c 
20 CIV  Cote  d'Ivoire 
b 
21 CMR  Cameroon 
22 COG  Congo,  Rep. 
23 COL  Colombia 
b, c 
24 CRI  Costa  Rica 
c 
25 CYP  Cyprus 
26 DNK  Denmark 
a, c 
27 DOM  Dominican  Republic 
c 
28 DZA  Algeria 
29 ECU  Ecuador 
c 
30  EGY  Egypt, Arab Rep. 
b, c 
31 ESP  Spain 
a, c 
32 FIN  Finland 
a, c 
33 FJI  Fiji 
34 FRA  France 
a, c 
35 GAB  Gabon 
36 GBR  United  Kingdom 
a, c 
37 GHA  Ghana 
c 
38 GMB  Gambia,  The 
39 GRC  Greece 
a, b, c 
40 GTM  Guatemala 
c 
41 HND  Honduras 
c 
42 HTI  Haiti 
c 
43 IDN  Indonesia 
b, c 
44 IND  India 
b, c 
45 IRL  Ireland 
a, c 
46  IRN  Iran, Islamic Rep. 
c 
47 ISL  Iceland 
48 ISR  Israel 
b, c 
49 ITA  Italy 
a, c 
50 JAM  Jamaica 
b 
51 JOR  Jordan 
b, c 
52 JPN  Japan 
a, c 
53 KEN  Kenya 
b 
54 KOR  Korea,  Rep. 
b, c 
55 KWT  Kuwait   
56 LKA  Sri  Lanka 
b, c 
57 LSO  Lesotho 
58 MAR  Morocco 
b, c 
59 MDG  Madagascar 
60 MEX  Mexico 
b, c 
61 MLI  Mali 
62 MLT  Malta 
63 MRT  Mauritania 
64 MUS  Mauritius 
65 MWI  Malawi 
66 MYS  Malaysia 
b, c 
67 NER  Niger 
68 NGA  Nigeria 
b, c 
69 NIC  Nicaragua 
c 
70 NLD  Netherlands 
a, c 
71 NOR  Norway 
a, c 
72 NPL  Nepal 
73 NZL  New  Zealand 
a, c 
74 OMN  Oman 
75 PAK  Pakistan 
b, c 
76 PAN  Panama 
c 
77 PER  Peru 
c 
78 PHL  Philippines 
b, c 
79  PNG  Papua New Guinea 
80 PRT  Portugal 
a, b, c 
81 PRY  Paraguay 
c 
82 RWA  Rwanda 
83 SAU  Saudi  Arabia 
84 SEN  Senegal 
85 SGP  Singapore 
c 
86 SLE  Sierra  Leone 
87 SLV  El  Salvador 
c 
88 SWE  Sweden 
a, c 
89 SWZ  Swaziland 
90 SYC  Seychelles 
91  SYR  Syrian Arab Republic 
c 
92 TCD  Chad 
93 TGO  Togo 
94 THA  Thailand 
b, c 
95  TTO  Trinidad and Tobago 
b 
96 TUN  Tunisia 
b, c 
97 TUR  Turkey 
b, c 
98 TZA  Tanzania 
99 UGA  Uganda 
100 URY  Uruguay 
c 
101 USA  United  States 
a, c 
102 VEN  Venezuela 
b, c 
103 ZAF  South  Africa 
b, c 
104 ZMB  Zambia   
105 ZWE  Zimbabwe 
b 
 
a – industrialized countries (IDC), 20 countries 
b – emerging market countries (EMG), 30 countries 
(Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2000)) 
c – countries for which Quinn (1997) variables exist 27
Appendix 2:  The “Pseudo-Quinn” Variable 
Quinn (1997) calculates a composite measure of financial regulation that ranges from 0 to 
14, with 14 representing the least regulated and most open regime. The bulk of the index is based 
upon Quinn’s coding of the qualitative information contained in the various issues of Annual 
Report on Exchange Restrictions and Exchange Arrangements (AREAER) pertaining to k2 and k3, 
augmented by information regarding whether the country in question has entered into international 
agreements with international organizations such as the OECD and EU.  
A complete tabulation for the OECD members exists, but the coverage for the less 
developed countries is much less extensive; values are reported only for certain years (1958, 1973, 
1982, and 1988).  Figure A-1 illustrates the index’s behavior for Argentina and for the United 
States. The lack of observations relating to the developing countries is frustrating as one would be 
particularly interested in the role of financial liberalization in emerging economies.  
As an expedient, we estimate a Quinn measure of financial regulation for the developing 
countries. The estimation of this “pseudo-Quinn” measure proceeds in the following manner. As a 
preliminary analysis, we used the entire sample to estimate the following relationship between the 
Quinn measure and the variables k1 through k4.  
 










When this regression is implemented over the entire sample of industrialized and less 
developed countries, all the coefficients entering with the expected positive sign, and with 
statistical significant (the kj variables take a value of one when a control is not in effect, and the 
Quinn measure takes on a higher value the weaker the restriction
31). This regression is a very blunt 
instrument to use to estimate the Quinn variable, but remarkably these four variables explain a 
majority of the variation in the index; the adjusted R
2 is 0.71.  
One might think that the relationship linking the Quinn measure and capital controls 
dummy variables differs over groups. One obvious distinction to examine is that between the 
industrialized and less developed countries. Equation (A-2) was estimated allowing for an 
intercept shift and differential slope coefficients. The intercept shift is statistically significant, but 
                                                           
31 Recall that the original kj variables took a value of unity when a control is in effect. We reverse the signs of  28
this may represent the fact that there are no observations on emerging market Quinn indices during 
the entire 1990's. The only differential slope coefficient that is significant is the capital account (k3) 
one, at the 7% marginal significance level. In order to further improve the performance of this 
linear imputation, we also included time trend for each country. 
 









i =+ + + ×+ +
= ∑ θθ λλ λ ν 0 1
4
123 3 ,  
where IDC
i = 1 for developed countries, and = 0, otherwise 
 
This estimation method increases the adjusted R
2 up to 0.92. Using this method, we estimate the 
pseudo-Quinn variable. The correlation between the pseudo-Quinn variable and KAOPEN is 
estimated to be 0.94. Figure A-2 displays the pseudo-Quinn and KAOPEN series for Argentina; 




                                                                                                                                                                                           
these binary variables to make the interpretation of KAOPEN more intuitive.  29
 Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 




Mean  Average Growth
Rate (%) 




1  Liquid Liabilities 
to GDP Ratio (LLY)  0.4514 0.0163 0.0205  1976 
2  Private Credit to 
GDP Ratio (PCGDP)  0.3178 0.0285 0.0396  1973 
3  M2 to GDP Ratio 
(M2Y)  0.4252 0.0133 0.0226  2144 
4  Stock Market Capitalization 
To GDP Ratio (SMKC)  0.2882 0.0587 0.1096  1015 
5  Stock Market Total Value 
Traded to GDP Ratio (SMTV)  0.1077 0.1530 0.4242  1063 
6  Stock Market Turn Over to GDP 
Ratio (SMTO)  0.2968 0.0293 0.2132  1000 
7  New Equity Issued to GDP Ratio 
(EQTY)  0.0131 0.0685 0.1782  522 
8  k1: Multiple Exchange Rates  0.7897 0.0076 0.0224  2183 
9  k2: Current Account  0.5190 0.0028 0.1313  2183 
10  k3: Capital Account  0.2461 0.0388 0.0600  2178 
11  k4: Surrender of Export 
Proceeds  0.2525 0.0542 0.1135  2182 
12  SHAREk3  0.2402 0.0370 0.0450  2358 
13  Capital Openness (KAOPEN)  0.000 0.0379  0.0917 2357 
14  Per Capita Income (in PPP) 
(RYPC)  5957.99 0.0551  0.0442  2115 
15  Trade Openness (OPN)  0.6966 0.0042 0.0307  2187 
16  Inflation(INFL)  0.1303 -0.0171 0.1691  2022 
Notes: Samples periods differ. Mean pertains to the untransformed variable. Growth rates calculated using log 
differences. Observations of inflation rates in excess of 100% are dropped from the sample. KAOPEN is the first 
standardized principal component of SHAREk3, k1, k2, and k4, each of which is the share of the last five years 
(including the observed year) when the capital account was open; the non-existence of multiple exchange rates; 
the openness of the current account; and no obligation of surrender of export proceeds. Since KAOPEN is a 




Correlations of Selected Financial Deepening Measures 
Full Sample 
 
  LLY  PCGDP  M2Y  SMKC  SMTV 
Liquid Liabilities 
To GDP Ratio  1        
Private Credit 
To GDP Ratio  0.812 1       




0.445 0.509 0.352  1   
Stock Market 
Total Value Traded 
To GDP Ratio 
0.475 0.538 0.380 0.690  1 
 






Financial Development and Financial Openness  
Full Sample, Five year panels, 1982-97 
 
 
     Liquid  Private  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Equity 
   Pred Liabilities  Credit  Capital'n Total  Value Turnover  Issued 
   sign  [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] 
Financial (+)  0.0021¶  0.0034***  0.0028  0.0063***  0.0003  0.0002 
 Openness [t-5]    (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0033) (0.0021) (0.0035)  (0.0003) 
Financial (-)  -0.0079  -0.0181¶ -0.0136  -0.0931*  -0.1126***  -0.0481** 
 Deepening [t-5]    (0.0095) (0.0112) (0.0338)  (0.0560)  (0.0303)  (0.0233) 
                
Per Capita  (+) 0.  0018  0.0040*** 0.0053  0.0062* 0.0170** -0.0003 
 Income [t-5]    (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0044) (0.0035) (0.0072)  (0.0004) 
Inflation [t-5]  (-)  -0.0075  0.0074  -0.0531*** -0.0248*  0.0063  -0.0018¶ 
     (0.0084) (0.0121) (0.0187) (0.0138) (0.0519)  (0.0012) 
Trade (+)  0.0039  0.0059** -0.0199  0.0030  -0.0087  -0.0004 
 Openness [t-5]    (0.0036) (0.0029) (0.0173)  (0.0071)  (0.0105)  (0.0006) 
                
R-squared   0.05 0.12 0.20  0.26  0.33 0.12 
N   300  298  148  156  150  55 
RMSE   0.022 0.022 0.044  0.036  0.066 0.003 
 
Notes: Point estimates from OLS, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Dependent variable is the average annual growth rate over a five year period. Financial 
openness variable is the first standardized principal component of SHAREk3, k1, k2, and k4, 
each of which is the share of the last five years (including the observed year) when the capital 
account was open, the non-existence of multiple exchange rates, the openness of the current 
account, and no obligation of surrender of export proceeds. N is the number of observations. 
RMSE is root mean squared error of the regression. Regressions include fixed time effects 
(estimates not reported). Observations of inflation rates in excess of 100% are dropped from the 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Financial Development and Financial Openness  
Instrumental Variables Estimation  
Full Sample, Five year panels, 1982-97 
 
 
     Liquid  Private  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt  Equity 
   Pred Liabilities  Credit  Capital'n Total  Value Turnover  Issued 
   sign  [1] [2] [3] [4]  [5] [6] 
Financial (+)  0.0099*** 0.0109***  0.0031  0.0170***  0.0193** 0.0005 
 Openness [t-5]    (0.0046) (0.0040) (0.0069) (0.0051) (0.0081)  (0.0011) 
Financial (-)  -0.0092  -0.0359** -0.0133  -0.1343***  -0.1211***  -0.0484** 
 Deepening [t-5]    (0.0097) (0.0148) (0.0333)  (0.0518)  (0.0321)  (0.0228) 
                
Per Capita  (+) -0.0041  0.0013  0.0042  -0.0010  -0.0017 -0.0006 
 Income [t-5]    (0.0035) (0.0026) (0.0066) (0.0054) (0.0105)  (0.0010) 
Inflation  [t-5]  (-) -0.0026 0.0016  -0.0571*** -0.0230  0.0378 -0.0010 
     (0.0101) (0.0145) (0.0209) (0.0183) (0.0675)  (0.0026) 
Trade (+)  0.0022  0.0038  -0.0219  -0.0008  -0.0168¶  -0.0006 
 Openness [t-5]    (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0173)  (0.0076)  (0.0124)  (0.0010) 
                
R-squared   NR
2 NR
2 0.23 0.19 0.25 0.10 
N   236  234  138  141  137  54 
RMSE   0.024 0.024 0.044  0.040  0.073 0.003 
 
Notes: Point estimates from 2SLS, with instrumental variables of regional dummies, lagged 
government budget surplus and current account balance. Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is the average annual growth rate over a five year 
period. Financial openness variable is the first standardized principal component of SHAREk3, 
k1, k2, and k4, each of which is the share of the last five years (including the observed year) when 
the capital account was open, the non-existence of multiple exchange rates, the openness of the 
current account, and no obligation of surrender of export proceeds. N is the number of 
observations. RMSE is root mean squared error of the regression. Regressions include fixed time 
effects (estimates not reported). Observations of inflation rates in excess of 100% are dropped 
from the sample. ¶(*)[**]{***} indicates marginal significance at the 20%(10%)[5%]{1%} level. 
“NR











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Selected Measures of Financial Deepening  

























Financial Development and Financial Openness  
Using the “Pseudo-Quinn” Measure  
Full Sample, Five year panels, 1982-97 
 
     Liquid  Private  Stock Mkt  Stock Mkt Stock Mkt  Equity 
   Pred Liabilities  Credit  Capital'n Total  Value Turnover  Issued 
   sign  [1] [2]  [3] [4] [5]  [6] 
Financial  (+) 0.0032 0.0083* 0.0053 0.0140** 0.0058 -0.0002 
 Openness [t-5]    (0.0043)  (0.0043) (0.0102) (0.0065) (0.0153)  (0.0014) 
Financial  (-) -0.0003 -0.0031 -0.0122  -0.0866  -0.1167***  -0.0560** 
 Deepening [t-5]    (0.0103)  (0.0113) (0.0321)  (0.0562)¶ (0.0306)  (0.0243) 
              
Per Capita  (+) -0.0016  0.0003  0.0047  0.0045  0.0144* -0.0003 
 Income [t-5]    (0.0032)  (0.0029) (0.0068) (0.0044) (0.0087)  (0.0008) 
Inflation [t-5]  (-)  -0.0108  0.0012  -0.0611***  -0.0341**  0.0112  -0.0029* 
     (0.0093)  (0.0150) (0.0213) (0.0148) (0.0612)  (0.0016) 
Trade (+)  0.0051  0.0075**  -0.0217  0.0044  -0.0118¶  -0.0002 
 Openness [t-5]    (0.0050)  (0.0037) (0.0182)  (0.0075)  (0.0085)  (0.0006) 
              
R-squared   0.03 0.08 0.23  0.27  0.36 0.13 
N    198 194  136 142 134 53 
RMSE   0.023 0.025 0.045  0.037  0.067 0.003 
 
Notes: Point estimates from OLS, heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Dependent variable is the average annual growth rate over a five year period. Financial openness 
variable is Quinn’s measure of financial openness, linearly extrapolated using the IMF’s individual 
capital control measures. N is the number of observations. RMSE is root mean squared error of 
the regression. Regressions include fixed time effects (estimates not reported). Observations of 
inflation rates in excess of 100% are dropped from the sample. ¶(*)[**]{***} indicates marginal 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure A-1  
Financial Openness Measure (Quinn) 
For USA and Argentina 
 
year
 usa  argentina















Figure A-2  
Financial Openness Measure 
KAOPEN vs. “Pseudo-Quinn” 
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